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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
I. Whether the Public Service Commission failed to 
comply with the Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act, Utah Code 
Ann,. § 63-46a-l, et seg. , thereby invalidating Commission Rule 
No. 8304 which purports to eliminate the Commission's jurisdic-
tion over one-way paging services. 
II. Whether the Public Service Commission erred in 
dismissing American Pagingfs Application for Certificate of Con-
venience and Necessity to operate a one-way telephone paging 
service on the basis that the Commission no longer has jurisdic-
tion to regulate paging services. 
III. Whether the Public Utilities Act, Utah Code Ann. 
§S 54-8b-l, et seg. (Supp. 1985), impacts the Public Service 
Commission's jurisdiction over one-way paging services. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Since 1962, the Utah Public Service Commission ("Com-
mission") has interpreted its regulatory authority over telephone 
corporations and the services provided by them to include one-way 
paging services. In fact, in a predecessor case to this action, 
this Court recently stated: 
Understanding the history of the 
Commission's assertion of regulatory author-
ity over one-way paging services is important 
to this case. In 1962, the Commission 
granted a Certificate of Public Convenience 
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and Necessity to operate both a two-way 
mobile telephone system and a one-way paging 
service to petitioner Mobile Telephone, Inc. 
By this action, and without objection from 
any party, the Commission assumed jurisdic-
tion over both one-way paging and two-way 
mobile telephone services under Sections 
54-2-1(21), (22), and (30) of the Code. 
(Footnote omitted.) Between 1962 and 1983 
the Commission granted similar duel authority 
certificates to three other companies. In 
1974, the Commission granted to Mobile Tele-
phone of Southern Utah, Inc., a single 
authority certificate covering only one-way 
paging service. From the record, it appears 
that the Commission has, on occasion, denied 
requests for certificates for one-way paging 
authority. Until 1983, however, the 
Commission's authority to regulate one-way 
paging services was not questioned. 
Williams v. Public Service Commission, 720 P.2d 773, 774 (Utah 
1986). 
The case referred to above is of interest not only 
because of the light it sheds on the Commission's twenty-year 
history of regulating one-way paging services, but also because 
it plays an important procedural role in the history of the case 
now before the Court. The decision in Williams was the result 
of an appeal filed by David Williams, petitioner herein, and 
1 The opinion prepared by Justice Zimmerman and filed on March 4, 
1986 in Williams v. Public Service Commission, 720 P.2d 773, 
(Utah 1986) provides a thorough statement of the facts pertinent 
to the initial appeal as well as to the present proceeding. 
Petitioner will not restate those facts but simply directs the 
Court's attention to its previous recital of the facts. A copy 
of the Court's opinion is contained in Appendix A. 
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other certificated providers of one-way paging service in 
response to action by the Commission which this Court determined 
was an improper attempt to deregulate one-way paging. In 
Williams, it was held that the Commission's attempts to deregu-
late one-way paging services constituted rulemaking and as such 
were subject to the provisions of the Utah Administrative 
Rulemaking Act. The Commission's failure to comply with the 
notice and hearing requirements of the Administrative Rulemaking 
Act required that this Court vacate the Commission's orders 
which, if allowed to stand, would have eliminated the 
Commission's jurisdiction over one-way paging services, "effec-
tively deregulating that field." Williams v. Public Service 
Commission, 720 P.2d at 775. 
Within weeks of the Court's opinion in Williams, the 
Commission filed a notice of proposed rulemaking with the Office 
of Administrative Rules, which purported to retroactively elimi-
nate the Commission's jurisdiction over one-way paging. The body 
of the notice simply stated: 
The Public Service Commission of Utah does 
not have jurisdiction over one-way paging 
service. The reason for the rule is that 
one-way paging service does not fall within 
the definition of a "telephone corporation" 
in that such service does not utilize a 
"telephone line." 
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This notice demonstrates a fundamental mis-reading of this 
Courtfs opinion in Williams and seeks to declare retroactively 
"no jurisdiction" rather than prospectively to deregulate a long 
regulated industry. (A copy of the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 
is contained in Appendix B.) Williams timely filed his objec-
tions to the Proposed Rule and requested a public hearing. (R. 
at 22) The proposed rule was adopted without adequate notice to 
all interested persons and without a hearing and made effective 
as Rule No. 8304 on May 16, 1986. (R. at 248) 
On April 30, 1985, after having provided paging service 
to the general public for nearly two years without authority, 
American Paging filed an application with the Commission for a 
Certificate of Convenience and Necessity to operate a public 
utility rendering paging services in designated areas in Utah. 
American Paging simultaneously filed a Motion to Dismiss its 
application on the ground that the Commission did not have 
jurisdiction over one-way paging. (R. at 248). In an order 
issued May 23, 1986, the Commission granted American Paging's 
Motion to Dismiss its application for lack of jurisdiction. (R. 
at 249) (See Appendix C). 
By this appeal, petitioner David Williams seeks review 
of the Commission's adoption of Rule No. 8304 and its dismissal 
of "American Paging's application for lack of jurisdiction. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Commission's first attempt to deregulate one-way 
paging services was vacated in Williams v. Public Service Com-
mission, supra, for failure to comply with the requirements of 
2 
the Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act. Its action in purport-
ing to adopt Rule No. 8304 is likewise invalid for, among other 
things, failure to even attempt to /'deregulate" a regulated 
industry and in failing to give adequate notice and an opportu-
nity for a hearing. 
The Commission clearly misinterpreted this Court's 
opinion in Williams since it did not even attempt to deregulate 
paging services. It simply declared, retroactively, that it 
"does not have jurisdiction over one-way paging services." The 
Commission's action is void on its face as a matter of law. 
The Commission's attempt to give notice of the proposed 
rule change was inadequate since the only notice given to 
Williams came in a collateral proceeding. Moreover, it does not 
appear from the record that notice was given to other interested 
parties and to the very same non-parties to whom no notice was 
given in the prior proceeding which this Court found to be 
fatally defective in Williams. Additionally, the notice was 
2 The Court in Williams did not reach the substantive issues 
which petitioner Williams maintains would have also prevented the 
Commission from denying its jurisdiction over one-way paging 
services. 
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ineffective and void because it failed to set forth the reasons 
and justifications for changing the longstanding rule previously 
adhered to by the Commission and acknowledged by the Court in 
Williams, Utah law provides that radical departures from admin-
istrative interpretation consistently followed cannot be made 
except for the most cogent reasons. Adoption of Rule No, 8304 
represents a radical departure from the Commission's twenty year 
old exercise of jurisdiction over one-way paging services, and 
since no cogent reasons compelling a departure from the 
Commission's longstanding practice were given, the rule should be 
vacated ab initio. 
Furthermore, the Commission is estopped from reversing 
its long-standing practice of regulating one-way paging services. 
The Commission originally assumed jurisdiction over one-way pag-
ing services by issuing certificates of necessity and public 
convenience to Williams and others. It then vigorously regulated 
these certificate holders and tightly controlled entry for many 
years. Williams relied on these certificates by expending in 
excess of a million dollars to develop a full service, sophisti-
cated paging service which he would not have done but for the 
certificates he received. As a result of Rule No. 8304, Williams 
has suffered and will continue to suffer injury as a direct 
result of his reliance in good faith on the Commission's twenty 
plus year history of regulating paging services. 
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The certificates of public convenience and necessity 
formerly issued by the Commission to Williams constitute valuable 
property rights. Because Rule No. 8304 effectively voids those 
certificates, it follows that Williams has been deprived of his 
property rights without compensation as required by substative 
principles of due process. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
COMMISSION RULE NO. 8304 IS INVALID BECAUSE THE 
COMMISSION FAILED TO COMPLY WITH JUDICIAL AND 
LEGISLATIVE REQUIREMENTS FOR DEREGULATION 
A. The Commission's Attempt to Escape Regulation of 
One-Way Paging is not in Accordance with the Utah Supreme Court's 
Opinion in the Williams Case. 
In Williams v. Public Service Commission, 720 P.2d 773 
(Utah 1986), a case involving virtually the same dispute between 
the same parties as this case, this Court concluded that "the 
Commission cannot reverse its long-settled position regarding the 
scope of its jurisdiction and announce a fundamental policy 
change without following the requirements of the Utah Adminis-
trative Rulemaking Act." Id. at 777. The legal and practical 
effect of the Commission's order in Williams was to deregulate a 
regulated industry by administrative fiat. The Court noted: 
Following the November hearing, the 
Commission formally ruled that it had no 
jurisdiction to regulate one-way paging ser-
vices, effectively deregulating that field. 
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720 P.2d at 775 (Emphasis added). The Court continued: 
[B]y deregulating the one-way paging market 
and permitting open competition in the mar-
ket, the decision altered the rights of all 
certificate holders, despite their explicit 
reliance on the Commission's prior interpre-
tation. 
id. at 776. 
Instead of complying with the Court's mandate in 
Williams by seeking to "deregulate" this long regulated industry 
in the future, the Commission summarily sought to wash its hands 
of this subject by simply declaring retroactively that the Com-
mission "does not have jurisdiction over one-way paging." (R. at 
29). Petitioner submits that this recent action by the Commis-
sion flies directly into the face of this Court's admonition to 
the Commission in Williams, is void on its face, and should be 
vacated. 
B. The Commission Again Failed to Comply with the 
Statutory Notice Requirements. 
One of the requirements of the Administrative 
Rulemaking Act, Utah Code Ann. § 63-46a-4 (1953) is that proper 
notice be given to all interested parties: 
(4) A copy of the rule analysis form shall be 
mailed to all persons who have made timely 
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request of the agency for advance notice of 
its rulemaking proceedings, and to any other 
person who, by statutory or federal mandate, 
or in the judgment of the agency, should also 
receive notice. (Emphasis added). 
The only notice provided to Williams came as a result of Chairman 
Cameron handing counsel for Williams a copy of Notice of Proposed 
Rule Change during a scheduling conference in a collateral pro-
ceeding. (R. at 24, 25). While the Commission purports to have 
provided notice to "the parties" (R. at 236), the record is 
silent as to the identities of those partiejs and to the manner in 
which notice, if any, was provided. Besides Williams, all other 
affected persons should have been given notice. At the very 
least, that should include all holders of certificates for 
one-way paging service. A primary reason the Commission's Order 
in Williams was vacated was because adequate advance notice was 
not given to all affected parties, including non-parties. 
Williams v. Public Service Commission, 720 P.2d at 777. Simi-
larly, Commission Rule No. 8304 should be vacated. 
Even though a "notice" was provided to Williams, it was 
wholly inadequate in terms of what must be set forth in a Rule 
Analysis Form. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46a-4(3) (1953) states: 
(3) The rule analysis form shall contain: 
(a) A summary of the rule of change; 
(b) the purpose of the rule or reason 
for the change; 
(c) the statutory authority or federal 
requirement for the rule; 
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(d) the anticipated cost or savings to 
the state budget and compliance costs for 
affected persons; 
(e) how interested persons may inspect 
the full text of the rule; 
(f) how interested persons may present 
their views on the rule; 
(g) the time and place of any scheduled 
public hearing; 
(h) the name and telephone number of an 
agency employee who may be contacted about 
the rule; and 
(i) the signature of the agency head or 
designee. 
The notice received by counsel for Williams contained little more 
than a statement indicating that the Commission did not have 
jurisdiction to regulate one-way paging services. To constitute 
a valid notice, the notice must contain the items prescribed in 
the statute. The Commission failed to give such a notice to 
Williams and other interested parties. It follows that its pur-
ported action is void and should be vacated. 
II. 
THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION ERRONEOUSLY 
CONCLUDED THAT, DESPITE A LONG HISTORY OF 
REGULATING ONE-WAY PAGING SERVICES, IT COULD 
DECLARE BY ADMINISTRATIVE FIAT A CHANGE IN THE 
LAW SO AS TO ELIMINATE ITS CONTINUING 
JURISDICTION OVER SUCH COMPANIES 
A. No Cogent Reasons Support Reversing the 
Commission's Long-Standing Regulation of One-Way Paging. 
In Williams, the Court was not required to reach the 
substantive question of under what circumstances, if any, the 
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Commission could, after complying with all procedural 
requirements, change existing substantive rules upon which the 
public had come to rely without revisiting the legislature to 
obtain authority to do so. That issue was addressed, however, in 
Husky Oil Co. v. State Tax Commission, 556 P.2d 1268 (Utah 1976). 
The Utah State Tax Commission had promulgated a regulation in 
1937 which exempted certain business transactions from sales tax. 
In 1971, after having complied with all applicable procedural 
requirements, the Utah Tax Commission by regulation reversed its 
long-standing position and eliminated the exemption. This Court 
reversed the Utah Tax Commission and set aside the de-exemption 
regulation, stating: 
Also, the Commission's S-38 Regulation 
which interpreted the statute in question for 
34 years to allow for an exemption of a sale 
such as the one in this case adds strength to 
retention of that exemption. The 
Commission's conclusion in the brief on 
appeal 'that administrative agencies . 
are free to depart from prior determinations' 
is not persuasive in this case. Said brief 
cites an opinion from this Court to buttress 
its conclusion, which on its facts is not 
controlling here. Justice Ellett does cite 
in that opinion, 73 C.J.S. Public Adminis-
trative Bodies and Procedure Section 148, in 
which it is stated that . . . administrative 
bodies are not ordinarily bound by their 
prior determinations . . . . But said Section 
148 continues as follows: 
However, prior determinations are 
entitled to great weight . . . and rad-
ical departures from administrative 
interpretation consistently followed 
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cannot be made except for most cogent 
reasons. 
The Commission has made radical depar-
tures from an interpretation unchangingly 
followed by it for more that three decades. 
And, in addition to matters already dis-
cussed, the inclusion of language in the 
current S-38(C) regulation, supra, does not 
infuse cogency into the reasons for those 
departures. 
556 P.2d at 1271 (Emphasis added). 
The Commission has consistently and continually exer-
cised jurisdiction over one-way paging services for more than two 
decades. The only reason profferred by the Commission for its 
drastic change in course is its assertion that "one-way paging 
service does not fall within the definition of a "telephone cor-
poration" in that one-way paging does not utilize a "telephone 
line". In view of twenty years of contrary interpretation of the 
statute, and the reliance placed on that interpretation by all 
certificate holders, this reason does not rise to the level of 
"cogency" called for in Husky Oil. The Commission failed to 
indicate any substantive policy considerations which called for 
deregulation or exemption, nor did it point to any circumstances 
which, in the public interest, would require the same. 
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B. The Commission is Estopped From Reversing Its 
Lonq-Standinq Practice of Regulating Paging Services, 
The principle of equitable estoppel "may be applied 
against the State, even when acting in a governmental capacity, 
if necessary to prevent manifest injustice, and the exercise of 
governmental powers will not be impaired as a result . . . ." 
Celebrity Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Commission, 
602 P.2d 689, 694 (Utah 1979). 
In Celebrity Club, Inc., appellant sought to establish 
a club licensed to serve alcohol. A statute prohibited the 
granting of a liquor license to any facility located within a 
600-foot radius of a public or private school. Upon inquiry, 
appellant was advised by the Utah Liquor Control Commission that 
it would not be in violation of the statute by reason of the 
club's location. In reliance of the Liquor Control Commission's 
representation, appellant expended a substantial sum of money to 
complete its club. The Liquor Control Commission thereafter 
denied the appellant's request for a liquor license on the ground 
that a different interpretation of the statute placed its club 
within 600 feet of a school. 
On appeal, this Court found the Liquor Control Commis-
sion to be equitably estopped from denying the application, 
stating: 
The elements essential to invoke the doctrine of equi-
table estoppel are: 
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(1) An admission, statement, or act inconsistent with 
the claim afterwards asserted, 
(2) action by the other party on the faith of such 
admission, statement, or act, and 
(3) injury to such other party on the faith of such 
admission, statement or act. 
602 P.2d at 694 
The application of this three-part test to the instant 
action shows that the Commission is estopped from denying its 
authority to regulate one-way paging services. The Commission 
granted certificates of public convenience and necessity for the 
offering of paging services to Williams, who in reliance thereon 
has expended in excess of one million dollars to develop a full 
service, sophisticated paging service which he would not have 
3 done but for the certificates he received. In a hearing held 
before the Commission on November 7, 1983, the following dialogue 
took place: 
Q. (By Mr. Burbidge) Would you have under-
taken to establish this vast network of 
transmission facilities had you not received 
a certificate of convenience and necessity 
from the Commission to operate as a public 
utility in the paging business? 
• • • 
3 Record of Case No. 19867 at 842-43. While this is not in the 
Record of this action, we request this Court to take judicial 
notice of the Record in the Williams case since all parties pre-
sent in this suit were present in the former action. 
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A. (By Mr. Williams) I absolutely would not 
have invested. 
(R. of Case No. 19867 at 185-86). Williams has been required to 
comply with the rules and regulations promulgated by the Commis-
sion for regulated utilities. (R. of Case No. 19867 at 400). 
Williams has been required to file and act in accordance with 
published tariffs, subject to approval and enforcement by the 
Commission. (R. of Case No. at 400). Petitioner Williams also 
has been required to pay sales tax upon its services premised 
solely upon its status as a public utility. Williams v. Public 
Service Commission, 720 P.2d at 776. Williams extended service 
to geographic areas which are less profitable in order to provide 
full service to the general public, a service which it would not 
have otherwise provided. (R. of Case No. 19867 at 844-45). As a 
result of the rule change by the Commission, Williams has suf-
fered, and will continue to suffer injury as a direct result of 
his reliance in good faith on the Commission's 20 year history of 
regulating paging services. In Celebrity Club, this Court stat-
ed: 
The doctrine of equitable estoppel is 
properly applicable in a case such as this, 
otherwise the whim of an administrative body 
could bankrupt an applicant 
who acted in good faith in reliance upon a 
solemn written commitment. 
• * * 
The conduct of government should always 
be scrupulously just in dealing with its 
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citizens; and where a public official, acting 
within his authority and with knowledge of 
the pertinent facts, has made a commitment 
and the party to whom it was made has acted 
to his detriment in reliance on that commit-
ment, the official should not be permitted to 
revoke that commitment. State v. Sponburqh, 
66 Wash. 2d 135, 401 P.2d 635, 640 (1965). 
602 P.2d at 689. It follows that the Commission is estopped from 
taking its purported action as a matter of law. 
III. 
THE COMMISSION'S ATTEMPT TO DEREGULATE PAGING 
SERVICES BY ADOPTING RULE NO. 8304 DOES NOT 
SATISFY THE STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS FOR EXEMPTING 
SUCH SERVICE FROM REGULATION. 
A. Sections 54-8b-2 and 54-8b-3 of Utah Code Ann. 
Clarify the Public Service Commission's Authority To Regulate 
Public Telecommunication Services and Provide a Specific Proce-
dure for Exempting Services From Regulation. 
Utah Code Ann. S§ 54-8b-l, et seg. (Supp. 1985) , was 
enacted by the Utah Legislature to clarify the Commission's 
authority to regulate public telecommunication services, and to 
provide a specific procedure for exempting certain services from 
regulation. Prior to enactment of Chapter 8b, the Commission had 
interpreted its jurisdiction over the telecommunications indus-
try, as defined by Utah Code Ann. §§ 54-2-1(21), (22) and (30), 
to include paging services. This Court so held in Williams v. 
Public Service Commission, supra. 
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Despite active lobbying to obtain an exemption for 
paging services by American Paging throughout the legislative 
session in which Chapter 8b was enacted, ioupled with the long 
and vigorous regulation by the Commission o^ paging services, the 
legislature declined to exempt paging services from application 
of the statue. Instead, the legislature adopted broad defini-
tional language which clarifies and solidifies early interpreta-
tions of the Commission including paging services within the 
scope of the regulatory scheme. Section 54-8b-2, subparagraph 
(3) states: 
"Public telecommunications services" 
means the transmission of signs, signals, 
writing, images, sounds, messages, data, or 
other information of any nature by wire, 
radio lightwaves, or other electromagnetic 
means offered to the public generally. 
Therefore, the legislature has now made clear that the 
Commission has jurisdiction over one-way paging services. The 
legislature also for the first time empowered the Commission to 
exempt regulated telecommunication services. However, that power 
was not unfettered. The Legislature imposed specific procedural 
and substantive requirements which must be complied with before 
the Commission may exempt any such service from regulation. 
These requirements are set forth in Section 54-8b-3, 
subparagraphs (1) and (2): 
(1) The Commission is vested with power and 
jurisdiction to partially or wholly exempt from 
-17-
any requirement of this title, any 
telecommunications, corporation or public tele-
communication service in this state. 
(2) The Commission, on its own initiative or 
in response to an application by a 
telecommunications corporation or a user of a 
public telecommunications service, may, after 
public notice and an opportunity for hearing, make 
findings and issue an order specifying its 
requirements, terms and conditions, exempting any 
telecommunication service from any requirement of 
this title either for a specific geographic area 
or in the entire state if the Commission finds 
that the telecommunications corporation or service 
is subject to effective competition, that the 
customers of the telecommunications corporation or 
service have reasonably available alternatives, 
and that the the telecommunications corporation or 
service does not serve a captive customer base, 
and if such exemption is in the public interest. 
In determining whether to exempt any telecommuni-
cation service from any requirement of this title, 
the Commission shall consider all relevant factors 
including, but not limited to: (a) the number of 
other providers offering similar services; (b) the 
intrastate market power and market share within 
the State of Utah of the telecommunications cor-
poration requesting exemption; (c) the intrastate 
market power and market share of other providers; 
(d) the existence of other providers to make 
functionally equivalent services readily available 
at competitive rates, terms and conditions; (e) 
the effect of exemption of the regulated revenue 
requirements of the telecommunications corporation 
requesting an exemption; (f) the ease of entry of 
other providers into the market place; (g) the 
overall impact of exemption on the public inter-
est; (h) the integrity of all service providers in 
their proposed market; (i) the cost of providing 
such service; (j) the economic impact on existing 
telecommunications corporations; and (k) whether 
competition will promote the provision of adequate 
service at just and reasonable rates. 
(Emphasis added). 
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Thus, in enacting Chapter 8b, the legislature has, for 
the first time, granted statutory authority to the Commission to 
4 deregulate by exemption. At the same time, the statute requires 
that the Commission meticulously follow both procedural and sub-
stantive requirements in order for the exemption to be valid. 
The Commission has failed both to provide adequate notice and 
opportunity for hearing to interested parties, and to show that 
it considered all of the factors identified by the statute in 
arriving at its decision. Indeed, it considered none of them. 
No order has been issued indicating the Commission's findings, 
nor the requirements, terms and conditions for exemption. Absent 
compliance with these statutory requirements, the Commission's 
attempt to declare itself unable to regulate one-way paging ser-
vices is invalid. 
B. Section 54-8b-9 does not Affect the Applicability 
of Other Sections of Chapter 8b to One-way Paging Services. 
In ruling on American Paging's Motion to Dismiss for 
lack of jurisdiction, the Commission concluded that Chapter 8b of 
the Public Utilities Act does not expand the jurisdiction of the 
Commission to include one-way paging. (R. at 236). This con-
clusion was apparently based on a premise that the Commission did 
4 Due to the enactment of Utah Code Ann. §§ 54-8b-l e_t seq. 
(Supp. 1985), the applicability of the Administrative Rulemaking 
Act to this situation is in serious question. Indeed, there is 
no question that the amendment was in effect at the time of the 
Commission's actions and should have controlled. 
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not already have jurisdiction (a premise flatly rejected in 
Williams) and on Section 54-8b-9 which provides: "Nothing in 
this chapter shall be construed to enlarge or reduce the 
Commission's jurisdiction over the services and entities for 
which jurisdiction is provided or excluded by other provisions of 
this title." 
The Commission's argument is misplaced for the follow-
ing reasons: 
1. The Commission's interpretation of Section 54-8b-9 
robs Section 54-8b-2 of any meaning whatsoever. At very minimum, 
Section 54-8b-2 must be read as a clarification of prior defini-
tions. Furthermore, the other provisions of the title had been 
long construed by the Commission to embrace and require regula-
tion of paging services. 
2. Any possible ambiguity is laid to rest by the 
legislative history created by the acts of American Paging. 
Knowing that paging service was specifically included within the 
definitions contained in the new chapter, American Paging 
actively lobbied throughout the legislative session in which this 
statute was enacted by the legislature to obtain a specific 
statutory exemption applicable to paging services. These Ameri-
can Paging efforts were made with the knowledge of and in the 
presence of Chairman Cameron. The legislature resolutely 
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rejected these attempts to read out of the statutory definition, 
by specific exemption, one-way paging services, (R. at 230,231) 
3. Even assuming arguendo that Section 54~8b-9 pre-
vented the 54-8b-2 definitions from meaning anything, it would 
not avail the Commission in this case because this Court ruled in 
the Williams case that paging services has been a regulated 
service in the State of Utah under the provisions of the statues 
as they existed prior to the 1985 amendments. 
Therefore, for the above stated reasons, Section 
54-8b-9 does not prevent the application of Chapter 8b to one-way 
paging services. 
IV. 
THE COMMISSION'S RULE DEPRIVES PETITIONER AND 
OTHER CERTIFICATE HOLDERS OF THEIR PROPERTY 
WITHOUT COMPENSATION IN VIOLATION OF THE 
RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW. 
A utility's certificate of public convenience and 
necessity constitutes a valuable property right. Schlagel v. 
Hoelsken, 162 Colo. 142, 425 P.2d at 39, 42, cert, denied 
Hoelsken v. Public Utilities Commission, 389 U.S. 827 (1967); See 
also City of St. George v. Public Service Commission, 565 P.2d 72 
(Utah 1977), Likewise, the certificates of public convenience 
and necessity issued by the Commission to Williams are valuable 
property rights — unless, of course Rule No. 8304 is allowed to 
stand in which case the certificates will be rendered worthless. 
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The Commission's Rule No. 8304 exempting one-way paging 
services from regulation effectively voids the certificates held 
by Williams thereby depriving him of his property rights without 
just compensation as required by substantive principles of due 
process. U.S. Const. Amend. 5; U.S. Const. Amend. 14; Utah 
Const. Art 1, § 7. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, the Commission's Rule 
No. 8304 should be vacated. Similarly, the Commission's Order-
issued in Case No. 85-2007-01 should be reversed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of September, 
1986. 
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-22-
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage 
prepaid, four true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of 
Pet: 
: p a i U ; l u u i L i u c : a n u L U I I C L L t u p X C D U I u n c i w i c v j w x i i y ui J. c J. < 
itioner, to the following on this £ - day oi^J2^r , 1986: 
David L. Stott 
Laurie L. Noda 
160 East 300 South 
Heber M. Wells Building 
Salt Lake City, UT . 84111 
Stuart L. Poelman 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAlj 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floorj 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145 
-23-
APPENDIX A 
David R. WILLIAMS, dba Industrial 
Communications, Petitioner, 
WILLIAMS v. PUBLIC SERVICE COM N OF UTAH Utah 773 
CUe as 720 ?2d 773 (Utah 1M6) 
requirements. U.C.A.1953, 54-1-1 et seq 
54-1-l i , 54-7-1.5, 54-7-13, 63-46a-l et 
seq., 63t-46a-2(8), 63-46a-3(3Xa), 63-46a-4; 
U.C.A.1953, 63-46-1, 63-46-3(4), 63-46-5 
(Repealed); Const. Art. 1, § 7, U.S C.A 
Const.Amend. 14. 
Sei publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
The PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION 
OF UTAH, Brent H. Cameron, Chair-
man; David R. Irvine, Commissioner; 
James M. Byrne, Commissioner, Re-
spondents. 
MOBILE TELEPHONE, INC., a 
corporation, Petitioner, 
• . 
The PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION 
OF UTAH, Brent H. Cameron, Chair-
man, David R. Irvine, Commissioner, 
James M. Byrne, Commissioner, Re-
spondents. 
Nos. 19867, 19873. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
March 4, 1986. 
2. Telecommunications $=>461 
Commissioners on Public Service Com-
mission who had participated in decision 
that no certificate of public convenience 
was required to operate one-way mobile 
telephone paging service, announced in let-
ter to prospective operator, would not be 
precluded from considering the jurisdiction-
al matted on remand on basis that they had 
violated statutory prohibitions against ex 
parte communications, where prospective 
operator was not party to any proceeding 
pending before Commission at time letter 
was issufed. U.C.A.1953, 54-7-1.5. 
Appeal was taken from order of the 
Public Service Commission holding that 
Commission had no authority to regulate 
one-way mobile telephone paging services. 
The Supreme Court, Zimmerman, J., held 
that Public Service Commission's decision 
that no certificate of public convenience 
and necessity was necessary to operate 
one-way mobile telephone paging service, 
announced in letter to prospective operator, 
was a "rule" within meaning of Adminis-
trative Rule Making Act so that Commis-
sion was required to follow Act's procedur-
al requirements. 
Vacated and remanded. 
1. Telecommunications ^='461 
Public Service Commission's decision 
that no certificate of public convenience 
and necessity was necessary to operate 
one-way mobile telephone paging service, 
announced in letter to prospective operator, 
was a "rule" within meaning of Adminis-
trative Rule Making Act [U.C.A.1953, 63-
46-3(4) (Repealed)], so that Commission 
was required to follow Act's procedural 
Keith E. Taylor, F. Robert Reeder, Mi-
chael L. Larsen, Brinton R. Burbidge, Salt 
Lake City, for petitioner. 
David L. Stott, Stuart L. Poelman, Salt 
Lake Citjy, for intervenor Amer. Paging. 
Stephen R. Handle, Salt Lake City, for 
Page Amer. 
David L. Wilkinson, Atty. Gen., Craig 
Rich, Ass^ t. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for 
respondents. 
ZIMMERMAN, Justice: 
Petitioners Industrial Communications 
and Mobile Telephone, Inc., appeal from an 
order of the Utah Public Service Commis-
sion ("Commission") holding that the Com-
mission has no authority to regulate one-
way mobile telephone paging services. Pe-
titioners allege, inter alia, that the Com-
mission (^ id not follow proper administra-
tive procedures in concluding that it lacked 
jurisdiction We agree that the Commis-
sion failed to adhere to proper require-
ments in ruling on the jurisdictional issue, 
and accordingly reverse and remand for a 
< 1 1 
m 
ill 
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new hearing that comports with the appli-
cable statutes. 
Understanding the history of the Com-
mission's assertion of regulatory authority 
over one-way paging services is important 
to this case. In 1962, the Commission 
granted a certificate of public convenience 
and necessity to operate both a two-way 
mobile telephone system and a one-way 
paging service to petitioner Mobile Tele-
phone, Inc. By this action, and without 
objection from any party, the Commission 
assumed jurisdiction over both oneway 
paging and two-way mobile telephone ser-
vices under sections 54-2-1(21), (22), and 
(30) of the Code.1 Between 1962 and 1983 
the Commission granted similar dual au-
thority certificates to three other compa-
nies. In 1974, the Commission granted to 
Mobile Telephone of Southern Utah, Inc., a 
single authority certificate covering only 
oneway paging service. From the record, 
it appears that the Commission has, on 
occasion, denied requests for certificates 
for oneway paging authority. Until 1983, 
however, the Commission's authority to 
regulate oneway paging services was not 
questioned. 
In the early 1980's, the Federal Commu-
nications Commission deregulated radio 
frequencies for use in paging services. 
Sixty-nine channels were made available in 
1. U.C.A., 1953, § 54-2-1(30) (Repl. Vol. 6A, 
1974), states in part: "The term 'public utility' 
includes every . . . telephone corporation . . . 
where the service is performed for, or the com-
modity delivered to the public generally " 
Subsection (22) states: 
The term "telephone corporation" includes ev-
ery corporation and person, their lessees, 
trustees and receivers or trustees appointed 
by any court whatsoever, owning, controlling, 
operating or managing any telephone line for 
public service within this state. 
Subsection (21) states: 
The term "telephone line" includes all con-
duits, ducts, poles, wires, cables, instruments 
and appliances, and all other real estate and 
fixtures and personal property owned, con-
trolled, operated or managed in connection 
with or to facilitate communication by tele 
phone whether such communication is had 
with or without the use of transmission wires. 
2. See 47 C.F.R. 22.501(a)(1) and (4), (d) and 
(p)(l) (1983). 
RTER, 2d SERIES 
Utah on a first-come, first-served basis.2 
Page America, Inc., American Paging, Inc., 
and United Paging Corporation each re-
ceived a permit from the Federal Communi-
cations Commission to operate on one of 
the new frequencies early in 1983.3 In 
May of 1983, American Paging's attorney 
contacted Commissioner Irvine to inquire 
whether American Paging could operate a 
one-way paging system without a certifi-
cate. At the request of this attorney, Com-
missioner Irvine discussed the issue with 
the other commissioners. Thereafter, the 
Commission sent a letter to the attorney 
for American Paging, dated June 3, 1983, 
stating that in the Commission's opinion, no 
certificate was required. It added that the 
Commission would not request a hearing 
on the issue.4 That letter is the basis of 
the controversy here. 
In August of 1983, Page America applied 
for a certificate to operate a paging ser-
vice; petitioner Industrial Communications 
protested the application. The Commission 
scheduled a public hearing on the applica-
tion for December of 1983, indicating its 
desire to "review" its jurisdiction over one-
way paging services. Page America later 
moved for a determination that it was ex-
empt from regulation. The Commission 
scheduled a hearing on that motion for 
November 7th. 
3. After receiving its permit from the FCC, Unit-
ed Paging Corporation applied to the Commis-
sion for a certificate of convenience and neces-
sity, which application was pending at the time 
of the Commission's hearing now under review. 
United Paging did not take part in that hearing 
and its present status is not apparent from the 
record. 
4. The letter read in pertinent part: 
Inasmuch as American Paging of Utah is pro-
posing to offer only one-way paging service, 
rather than telephone service as defined in the 
Utah Code, it does not appear necessary for 
your client to file an application for a certifi-
cate of public convenience and necessity. As 
a matter of policy the Commission does not 
construe its jurisdiction on an informal basis, 
but deems the statute sufficiently clear on its 
fact that it would not, on its own motion. 
require a hearing with respect to your pro-
posed operation. 
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Meanwhile, American Paging had begun 
operations without a certificate in reliance 
on the Commission's June letter declinmg 
to exercise jurisdiction. Industrial Commu-
nications therefore asked the Commission 
to issue a cease and desist order to stop 
American Paging from operating without a 
certificate. A hearing on the cease and 
desist request was held October 24, 1983. 
At that hearing, the Commission admitted 
it was in a dilemma inasmuch as it had 
"contradicted itself somewhat by the is-
suance of the June 3rd, 1983 letter." The 
Commission refused to order American 
Paging to stop operations; however, it or-
dered American Paging not to accept new 
customers until after the November hear-
ing on Page America's certificate at which 
the jurisdictional issue would be reviewed. 
Following the November hearing, the 
Commission formally ruled that it had no 
jurisdiction to regulate one-way paging ser-
vices, effectively deregulating that field. 
The Commission dismissed Page America's 
application for a certificate and cancelled 
the certificates of Industrial Communica-
tions and Mobile Telephone, Inc., to the 
extent they authorized one-way paging ser-
vices. It also cancelled the certificate 
granted to Mobile Telephone of Southern 
Utah, Inc., authorizing the operation of a 
one-way paging system.5 
After the ruling, Industrial Communica-
tions, which had opposed deregulation, 
sought a reversal of the Commission's or-
der and a disclosure of ex parte communi-
cations relating to the jurisdictional issue. 
It also moved for a rehearing before a 
commission pro tempore, claiming that by 
virtue of the June letter to American Pag-
ing, the Commission had prejudged the jur-
5. Two companies not participating in the hear-
ing still hold certificates of convenience and 
necessity for one way paging services. 
6. Section 54-1-1.6 of the Code, enacted in 1983 
(1983 Utah Laws ch 246, § 5), provides for a 
commissioner pro tempore to be appointed by 
the governor when a commissioner is "tempo-
rarily dismissed or disqualified " Commission-
ers pro tern shall have the qualifications re 
quired for public service commissioners. 
7. The Utah Rule Making Act was repealed and 
replaced in its entirety after the facts giving rise 
isdictional issues.* The Commission ac 
kno>(vledged the June letter and the con-
tacts leading up to it, but refused to set 
aside its order for any reason On appeal. 
Industrial Communications and Mobile 
Telephone, Inc., challenge the Commis-
sion's actions. 
Tl|e principal procedural point raised by 
petitioners is that the Commission's June 
letter effectively operated to relinquish the 
Commission's jurisdiction over one-way 
paging, and stripped petitioners and their 
similarly situated competitors of a valuable 
property right—their certificates. Petition-
ers argue that under the provisions of the 
Utah Administrative Rule Making Act, the 
hearing provisions of the Public Service 
Commission Act, and the due process claus-
es ojf state and federal constitutions, the 
Jun^ letter constituted a de facto rule mak-
ing Which required that all interested par-
ties be given proper notice and an opportu-
nity to be heard. See U.C.A., 1953, § 63-
46-5 (2nd Repl. Vol. 7A, 1978); U.C.A., 
1951 § 54-7-13 (Repl. Vol. 6A, 1974); Utah 
Const, art I, § 7; and U.S. Const amend. 
XIV, 
[ lj We first inquire whether the Com-
mission's actions complied with the proce-
dural requirements of the statutes govern-
ing agency rule making or agency adjudica-
tion. Any state agency promulgating a 
rule must follow the procedures specified 
in t^at act. U.C.A., 1953, § 63-46-1 (2nd 
Kept Vol. 7A, 1978).7 A rule is defined as 
a "Statement of general applicability . . . 
that implements or interprets the law or 
prescribes the policy of the agency in the 
administration of its functions " 
U.C.A., 1953, § 63-46-3(4) (2nd Repl. Vol. 
to this action occurred Our conclusion would 
noi be any different were we to analyze this 
ca$e under the new statute. 1985 Utah Laws ch 
15^, § 2. The statute now requires rule making 
whenever "agency actions affect a class of per 
sons" and defines a rule as "a statement made 
by an agency that applies to a general class of 
persons [which] implements or interprets 
po icy made by statute " U.C A, 1953, 
§ to-46a-3(3)(a), -2(8) (2nd Repl Vol 7A. 1978 
and Supp 198S) 
776 Utah 720 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
7A, 1978). The Public Utilities Act, also 
relied on by petitioners, requires that the 
Commission give notice and hold a hearing 
before it alters, amends, or rescinds an 
order or decision. U.C.A., 1953, § 54-7-13 
(Repl. Vol. 6A, 1974). Petitioners claim 
that the procedural requirements of at 
least one of these statutes apply here be-
cause the June letter constituted either a 
"rule" within the meaning of the Rule Mak-
ing Act, or an "order" within the meaning 
of the Public Utilities Act. 
The Commission argues that the June, 
1983, letter was not a rule making within 
the meaning of the Utah Rule Making Act 
because it did not have general applicabili-
ty. The Commission also argues that be-
cause it had never formally determined 
that it had jurisdiction to regulate paging 
services under the Public Utilities Act, it 
was free to announce its opinion on the 
subject without any procedural formalities. 
There is no merit to the Commission's ar-
guments. 
As an initial matter, we note that the 
Utah Administrative Rule Making Act 
seems most directly on point here. It deals 
in some specificity with matters that the 
Public Utilities Act covers only inferential-
ly, and the Rule Making Act's provisions do 
not appear inconsistent with the earlier en-
acted utility statute. 
The pivotal question is whether the deci-
sion announced by the Commission in the 
June letter amounted to a rule. It might 
be argued that the Commission's action 
here is merely legitimate law development 
through adjudication as opposed to rule 
making. We acknowledge that there is a 
variance of opinion on when an agency is 
engaged in rule making and must follow 
formal rule making procedures, and when 
an agency may legitimately proceed by 
way of adjudication. See, e.g., NLRB v. 
Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 89 S.Ct. 
1426, 22 L.Ed.2d 709 (1969); and NLRB v. 
Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 94 S.Ct. 
1757, 40 L.Ed.2d 134 (1974). However, we 
think that there are some fundamental 
points of reference in this area of the law 
that are of assistance in determining 
whether the Commission should have pro-
ceeded by formal rule making Professor 
Davis summarized some of these considera-
tions. 
Although a retroactive clarification of 
uncertain law may be brought about 
through adjudication, according to [SEC 
v. Cheney Corp., 332 U.S. 194 [67 S.Ct. 
1575, 91 L.Ed. 1995 (1947) ] and its many 
progency . . . , the problem may be differ-
ent when an agency through adjudication 
makes a change in clear law, as when it 
overrules a batch of its own decisions, 
especially if private parties have acted in 
reliance on the overruled decisions. 
2 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise 
§ 7:25, at 122 (2d ed. 1978). Interpreting 
the definition of "rule" contained in section 
63-46-3(4), in light of these considerations, 
leads us to the conclusion that the Commis-
sion was engaged in rule making and had 
to follow the requirements of the Utah 
Administrative Rule Making Act.8 
First, the Commission's decision was 
generally applicable: by deregulating the 
one-way paging market and permitting 
open competition in the market, the deci-
sion altered the rights of all certificate 
holders, despite their explicit reliance on 
the Commission's prior interpretation Sec-
ond, the letter interpreted the scope of the 
Commission's statutory regulatory powers, 
thus "interpreting] the law," within the 
meaning of the Rule Making Act. More-
over, in so acting the Commission, in the 
words of Professor Davis, made a "change 
in clear law." For over twenty years, the 
Commission has interpreted its authority 
over telephone corporations to include one-
way paging services. It has required cer-
tificate holders to file tariffs and pay public 
utility sales taxes. It has denied some" 
requests for certificates. In one case, it 
issued a certificate that covered only one-
way paging. In Medic-Call, Inc v. Public 
Service Commission, 24 Utah 2d 273, 470 
P.2d 258 (1970), the Commission even went 
8. For these reasons, section 54-7-1.5, governing 
the functions of the Commission when entering 
an order, has no application to the June letter 
or the proceedings leading up to its issuance 
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to court to defend its jurisdiction over pag-
ing services.* 
Under all these circumstances, we con-
clude that the Commission cannot reverse 
its long-settled position regarding the scope 
of its jurisdiction and announce a funda-
mental policy change without following the 
requirements of the Utah Administrative 
Rule Making Act. See, e.g., Ford Motor 
Co. v. FTC, 673 F.2d 1008 (9th Cir.1981), 
cert, denied, 459 U.S. 999, 103 S.Ct. 358, 74 
L.Ed.2d 394 (1982); see also 2 K. Davis, 
Administrative Law Treatise § 7:25, at 
125 (2d ed.1978). These requirements were 
not met. Nonparties were not given notice 
of the Commission's intention to reconsider 
its long-held position in connection with the 
June letter. And the November adjudica-
tive hearing certainly cannot be considered 
an adequate substitute for a rule making 
proceeding. Many of the protections pro-
vided for by the Act were missing from 
that proceeding, including adequate ad-
vance notices to all affected parties, an 
opportunity to participate, and an opportu-
nity to comment on the proposed rule. 
U.C.A., 1953, § 63-46a-4 (2d Repl. Vol. 7A, 
1978, Supp.1985). Because the require-
ments of the Act were not satisfied, the 
rule is vacated and the matter is remanded 
for further proceedings. 
[2] The next issue is whether the cur-
rent commissioners should be precluded 
from considering the jurisdictional matter 
on remand. Petitioners contend that the 
commissioners who participated in the deci-
sion announced in the June letter had pre-
judged the jurisdictional issue. Therefore, 
they request that we order the recusal of 
all the commissioners and the appointment 
of a commission pro tempore. 
Petitioners assert that recusal is neces-
sary because the opinion announced in the 
June letter violated the statutory prohibi-
tions against ex parte communication 
about matters pending before the Commis-
sion. Section 54-7-1.5 provides in part: 
9. This Court ruled in Medic Call that the PSC 
could have no jurisdiction over a private non-
profit paging service because it was not a public 
utility. We did not reach the issue of whether a 
No member of the public service commis-
sion . . . shall make or knowingly cause 
to be made to any party any communica-
tion relevant to the merits of any matter 
under adjudication unless notice and an 
opportunity to be heard are afforded to 
all parties. No party shall make or 
knowingly cause to be made to any mem-
ber of the commission . . . an ex parte 
communication relevant to the merits of 
any matter under adjudication. 
Th^re are several problems with petition-
ers' Argument. By its terms the statute 
does not apply to dealings between the 
Commission and American Paging. In 
May land June of 1983, American Paging 
was Jiot a party to any proceeding pending 
befor^ the Commission that involved the 
question of the Commission's jurisdiction 
over jone-way paging services. Moreover, 
the letter was not an adjudication but, in 
substance, a rule making, as we have noted 
abov .^ Therefore, any dealings between 
American Paging and the commissioners 
could not be a communication between a 
"party" and a member of the Commission 
"relevant to the merits" of "any matter 
under adjudication." Second, section 54-7-
1.5 was not effective until July 1, 1983, 
almost a month after the letter was writ-
ten. See 1983 Utah Laws ch. 246, § 15. 
It is true that the later proceedings be-
fore the Commission on the application of 
Page I America for a certificate should be 
classified as an "adjudication" within the 
meaning of section 54-7-1.5, and that these 
proceedings occurred after the effective 
date ()f the statute. However, that does 
not change the nature of the May and June 
comm|unications between the Commission 
and A(merican Paging nor the fact that the 
statute, by its terms, does not apply to 
them. 
Because the jurisdictional issue likely 
will b£ resolved by a rule making proceed-
ing orj remand and will obviate the need for 
further proceedings, we need not further 
publicly available paging service, such as pen 
tioners here operate, would be a public utility 
because our holding was limited to the private 
natufe of the arrangements before us 
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consider whether and under what circum-
stances recusal may be required in adminis-
trative adjudications when the specific pro-
visions of section 54-7-1.5 do not apply. 
Plainly, having participated in a rule mak-
ing proceeding does not automatically pre-
clude a commissioner from participating in 
a later, properly conducted adjudication. 
We have considered the other issues 
raised and find their disposition unneces-
sary to the result. The Commission's rule 
is of no force and effect, and its order is 
vacated. The matter is remanded for pro-
ceedings consistent with this opinion. 
HALL, CJ., and STEWART, HOWE and 
DURHAM, JJ., concur. 
f HYMUMWt SYSTEM^ 
Jose Antonio LOPEZ, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
v. 
Fred C. SCHWENDIMAN, Chief, Driver 
License Services, Utah Department of 
Public Safety, Defendant and Respon-
dent 
No. 20112. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
June 12, 1986. 
Utah State Driver License Division re-
voked driving privileges of driver for peri-
od of one year. The Seventh District 
Court, Carbon County, Richard C. David-
son, J., affirmed the administrative deci-
sion. Driver appealed. The Supreme 
Court, held that: (1) statute providing for 
arrest of one "in actual physical control" of 
vehicle while under the influence of alcohol 
and/or drugs was intended by legislature 
to protect public safety and apprehend 
drunken driver before he or she strikes and 
may not be construed to exclude those 
whose vehicles are presently immobile be-
cause of mechanical trouble, and (2) driv-
er's refusal to submit to breath test upon 
rumors that there had been incidents of 
tampering with breathalyzer in the past 
was nevertheless refusal, subjecting de-
fendant to license revocation. 
Affirmed. 
1. Automobiles e»144.2(9) 
In revocation proceeding, Driver Divi-
sion has burden to show that operator of 
vehicle was in actual physical control of 
motor vehicle and that arresting officer 
had grounds to believe that operator was 
under influence of alcohol. 
2. Automobiles e=>144.2(10) 
In trial de novo, district court must 
determine by preponderance of evidence 
whether driver's license was subject to rev-
ocation for driving under the influence of 
alcohol. U.C.A.1953, 41-6-44.10. 
3. Automobiles <S=>144.2(3) 
Supreme Court's review of district 
court's determination as to whether driv-
er's license was subject to revocation for 
driving while under the influence of alcohol 
is deferential to trial court's view of evi-
dence unless trial court has misapplied 
principles of law or its findings are clearly 
against weight of evidence. 
4. Automobiles <3=*144.1(1) 
Even if truck was inoperable at time 
that licensee was found sleeping in it and 
arrested, that would not preclude him from 
having "actual physical control" over truck 
so that his driver's license could be revoked 
if he had statutorily prohibited blood alco-
hol content. U.C.A.1953, 41-6-44.10(1, 2). 
5. Automobiles <s=>349 
Statute providing for arrest of one "in 
actual physical control" of vehicle while 
under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs* 
was intended by legislature to protect pub-
lic safety and apprehend drunken driver 
before he or she strikes and may not be 
construed to exclude those vehicles are 
presently immobile because of mechanical 
APPENDIX B 
State of Utah 
Administrative Rule Analysis 
Notice of Proposed Rule/Change 
008304 
AGENCY FILE-NUMBER 
Office of Administrative Rules 
tfe Archives Building, State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone 533-4647 
Department:
 P u b i i c s e r v i c e Commission of Utah 
Agency: ^ 
Address: 160 E a s t 300 South, SLC, Utah 
Contact Person: David L. S t o t t or Joe Dunlop 
Telephone: 530-6716 
SHORT TITLE OF RULE 
Commission jurisdiction over one-way paging services 
3RIEF SUMMARY OF RULE OR CHANGE AND REASON FOR IT • 
The Public Service Commission of Utah doe$ not have jurisdiction 
>ver one-way paging services. The reason foi: the | rule is thfct one-way 
waging service does not -fall within the-def iriitl-onrof a* "telephone^ ~ 
:orporationH in that such service does not utilise a "telephone line". 
ANTICIPATED COST IMPACT OF RULE — UCA 63-46a-4(3)(d) 
No c o s t impact 
TYPE OF NOTICE 
PROPOSED RULE (NEW, AMEND OR REPEAL) 
CHANGE IN PROPOSED RULE (CHANGES PROPOSED RULE NUMBER 
O 120-DAY RULE - UCA S3-46a-7 
• FiVS-YEAR REVIEW/CONTINUATION 
JUSTIFICATION FOR 120-DAY RULE CHECKED ABOVE 
^ "^
Lf ^I"^5^^SIA T^C O D E (^ , T A T '5> r l ) i54-4 r ijl J^^SiaE^eme^ jcbxart Case No. 19367 D RULE REQUIRES BY FEDERAL MANDATE (U.S. CODE OR FED. REGISTER ClTATIOl $ 
PU8UC MAY PARTICIPATE (N RULEMAKING BY: 
PUBLIC HEARING 
VTE: TIME: 
ACE: 
U APPEARANCE AT 
AGENCY UNTIL 
XJ WRITTEN COMMENT 
U N T ,
^ K a y / , 1936 
NOTE: PUBLIC MAY REQUEST HEARING IN ACCORDANCE WITH UCA 63-46a-5(1)(b) 
•\E FULL TEXT OF ALL PROPOSED ADMINISTRATIVE RULES OR RULE CHANGES IS PUpLISHED IN THE UTAH STATE BULLETIN UNLESS 
<CLUDED BECAUSE OF LENGTH AND SPACE LIMITATION. THE FULL TEXT MAY BE INSPECTED AT THE AGENCY (ADDRESS ABOVE) OR 
FFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE RULES. 
AUTHORIZATION 
IGNATURE OF AGENCY H £ A D ORDtSKiNEE 
Brent H. Cameron, Chairman 
• Afcje / T v o c n i 
9. OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE RULES 
tfarch 1 3 , ]|936>recEi\fccrBY; 
DATE 
?SC o f Utah 
AGENCY 
M3ATE. 3-25-86 TIME: 
" 120-OAY RULE EFFECTIVE:* NA.* ^ # > . ' , -
: 1 2 0 - 6 A V RULE LAPSES: NA r^r; 
BRENTH.CAMERON ~ - < ~ ^ ' ."../:-
JAMES M. BYRNE <•'./- r 1' s 
MEMORANDUM
 BR|AN t ^ ^ m /?/T <•///,, 
TO: 
FROM: 
DATE: 
Brent H. Cameron 
James M. Byrne 
Ted Stewart 
Joe Dunlop 
May 16, 1986 
RE: RULE ON ONE-WAY PAGING SERVICES, Case No. 8 6 - 9 9 9 - 0 * 
I recommend adoption of the one-way paging rule e f f e c t i v e today, 
APPENDIX C 
- BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH -
In the Matter of the Applica- ) 
tion Of AMERICAN PAGING, INC. ) 
(OF UTATO for a Certificate of ) 
Convenience and Necessity to ) CASE NO, BS-^OO^-Ql 
Operate as a Public Utility ) 
Rendering Paging Service to the ) ORDER GRANTING MOTION 
General Public in Areas of Box ) TO DISMTSS 
Elder, Weber, Morgan, Davis, ) 
Salt Lake, Utah, Summit, Wasatch) 
and Tooele Counties, Utah, ) 
ISSUED: May H3, 1986 
By the Commission: 
On or about August 10, 1983, Page America Inc. filed an 
application with the Commission to provide one-way paging ser-
vice. On November ?8, 1983, however, the Commission ruled that 
it had no statutory jurisdiction over paging services. The case 
was subsequently appealed to the Utah Supreme Court. 
On or about April 30, 1985 American Paging Inc. (Ameri-
can Paging) filed an application with the Commission to provide 
one-way paging service to the general public between points in 
Box Elder, Weber, Morgan, Davis, Salt Lake, Utah, Summit, Wasatch 
and Tooele Counties within that area. American Paging filed 
simultaneously a Motion to Dismiss its Application for the reason 
that the Commission, in its Order of November HC, 1983, had 
determined that it did not have jurisdiction to regulate one-way 
paging services. American Paging also stated that although the 
1985 Utah Legislature amended the Public Utilities Act by adding 
Chapter 8b. empowering the Commission to wholly or partially 
exempt certain competitive telecommunication services or service 
CAPE MO. 85-2007-01 
providers, said chapter did not expand the Commission's jurisdic-
tion beyond that which it already had. 
On or about March 4, 1986, the Utah Supreme Court ruled 
that the Commission's deregulation of one-way paging was defec-
tive because the Commission had attempted the deregulation 
through an Order construing its jurisdiction rather than through 
rulemaking under4 the Administrative Rulemaking Act. 
Thereafter, in accord with the instruction of the 
Supreme Court, the Commission filed a notice of proposed rule-
making with the Office of Administrative Rules on April 15, 1986, 
which stated that the Commission did not have jurisdiction over 
one-way paging and the reasons for it. Notice was provided to 
the parties. No party requested a hearing within the 15-day 
period following publication as required by the Utah Administra-
tive Rulemaking Act. The rule was formally adopted and made 
effective May 16, 1986. 
The Commission further concludes from the comments and 
oral arguments of the parties that Chapter 8B of the Public 
Utilities Act of the Utah Code does not expand the jurisdiction 
of the Commission to include one-way paging. 
Based upon the foregoing, the Commission will make the 
following: 
ORDER 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, That the Commis-
sion, having issued a rule pursuant to the Utah Administrative 
Rulemaking Act and in accord with the direction of the Utah 
CAr>E *JQ. B5-2007-01 
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Supreme Court that it does not have jurisdiction over one-way 
paging services and having further determined that Chapter 8B of 
the Public Utilities Act does not expand the jurisdiction of the 
Commission to include one-way paging, hereby grants American 
Paging's Motion to Dismiss its Application for a Certificate of 
Convenience and Necessity to provide one-way paging services. 
DATED at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 23rd day or May, 
1986. 
/s/ Brent H. Cameron, Chairman 
(SEAT,) /s/ Janes M. Bvrne, Commissioner 
/s/ Brian T. Stewart, Commissioner 
Attest: 
/s/ Georgia B. Peterson, Secretary 
